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I 
   The Civil Code of Japan and the Code of Civil Procedure of Japan 
prescribe in their own fashion the method to enforce the obligation to 
make some declaration of intention (for example, an offer of contract, an 
acceptance theirof, an application for registration, etc.). 
   Art. 414 II of the Civil Code of Japan. "If, where the nature of 
an obligation does not admit of specific performance, the subject of the 
obligation is an act, the obligee may apply to the Court to cause it to 
be done by a third person at the expence of the obligor ; however, 
with regard to an obligation having a juristic act for its subject, a 
decision of the Court may be substituted for a declatation of intention 
by the obligor. " (Cited from the text in English, compiled by Attorney-
General's Office of Japan). 
   Art. 736. of the Code of Civil Procedure of Japan. "If the debtor 
is ordered by judgement to admit the existence of a relation of right 
or to make some other expression of intention, such admission or ex-
pression of intention is deemed to have been made upon the judgement 
becoming final and conclusive. If the admission or the expression of 
intention is to be dependent on some counter performance, such effect is 
produced when in accordance with the provisions of Arts. 518 and 520 
an executory exemplification has been issued." (Cited from the text in 
English, compiled by Liaison Section, General Secretariat, Supreme Court 
of Japan.) 
    As a rule, if a obligor is ordered by judgement to make some 
declaration of intention, such declaration of intention is deemed to have
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been made upon the judgement becoming final and conclusive. In this' 
case, no such actual acts of execution are not made as. seizure, realization 
or distribution common in the case of the. execution against other debts= 
or obligations. What is the reason for such a specific way of execution ? 
A common opinion is as follows: The very interest of a obligee in the 
claim for some declaration of intention consists not so much in the 
actual performance itself of a declaration by the obligor as in the legal 
effect to be produced thereby, so, it is sufficient to realize the obligee's 
right, if by any provisions of law the same legal effect can only be 
produced as if the obligor actually made a declaration of intention. But, 
can such a fiction alone be enough to complete the execution? In other 
words, can it be possible that a declaration of intention by a legal fiction 
should function precisely in the same way as a real declaration by the, 
obligor ? To examine this problem is the . purpose of my treatise. 
                             II 
   In solving the problem, first of all, we ought to make clear the 
contents` of the judgement by which the obligor is ordeted to make 
some declaration of intention. 
   There have been two opposing theories about the essence of this: 
judgement, the one having been called " decretive judgement heory" 
(die' Verurteilungsurteilstheorie) and the other, "constitutive judgement 
theory" (die Gestaltungsurteilstheorie) -the former having a general 
currency at present in our country as well as in Germany. 
   The latter has been advocated especially by Kipp and Langheineken. 
They say as follows* : The essense of a decretive judgement consists, it 
is true, in its order for performance stated in formal adjudication of the, 
judgement. But this order is, so far as a judgement ordering to make 
some declaration of intention is concerned, little more than a pure 
formality ; the law itself not only hardly expects to find this order 
obeyed by the obligor, but also even makes it quite impossible for him 
   Kipp, Die Verurtheilung zurAbgabe von Willenserklarungen and zu Rechtshandlungen. 
Festgabe der Kieler Juristenfakultat zu Rudolf von Jherings fiinfzigjahrige Doktorjubi-
laum. (1892) S.71 ff. Langheineken, Der Urteilsanspruch. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom 
Klagrecht. (1899) S.252 ff.
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to obey it, for, on the one hand, before the judgement has become irrevo-
cable, an obligation to make some declaration of intention cannot be 
enforced by law, and on the other, upon the judgement having become final 
and conclusive, a legal situation in which the obligation has been performed 
is produced without any acts of the obligor and therefore after that 
there is no room for performance. Hence this conclusion ; the only one 
content of the judgement is an order that everything shall be dealt 
with in much the same way as if the obligor actually made a declaration 
of intention, so a judgement ordering to make some declaration of 
intention is a constitutive judgement. 
   I should like to think, following "decretive judgement theory ", 
that a judgement ordering to make some declaration of intention is in 
itself, like other judgement ordering performance essentially a decretive 
judgement which has the special effect that the way of its execution is 
extremely shortened by a legal fiction. 
   I also can't help admitting that the legal effect of a fictitious 
declaration of intention can be produced automatically, as it were, 
without any application by the obligee for a execution on the 
judgement having become final and conclusive, besides can be set up 
not only against the parties but also against all people, and that therefore 
a judgement ordering to make the declaration of intention looks in 
appearance very much like a constitutive judgement. But it is evident 
that this theory can be in no sense consistent with the latter part of 
Art. 736 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Japan, according to which, 
in case an declaration of intention is to be dependent on some counter 
performance is made, the time when a declaration of intention is produced 
by a fiction is after the judgement has become final and conclusive. 
Further, that claim for some declaration of intention which constitutes 
the subject-matter of the procedure is not a claim for constitution but a 
common claim for performance. Consequently, we must think that a 
judgement ordering to make some declaration of intention is nothing 
but a decretive judgement and that the legal fiction employed only has 
to do with the effect of the judgement.
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   Furthermore, , I > am glad to say that the historical development of 
the ` institution favors our= view as well. It was Art. 70 of the Code of 
Execution` of Sachsen (1838) that adopted for the first time the, way 
of the execution by legal fiction against the obligation to make some 
declarationof intention.. And =before this Code there was no difference 
between- the way of the execution against the obligation to make some 
declaration of intention and that of the execution against other obligat-
ions to do an act. -~ Besides, according to Art. 70 of the Code of Excution 
of Sachsen, the obligor is, to be. ordered.:.. by -.judgement to. make some 
declaration of intention within. the "i-Paritionsfrist determined in the 
judgement the obligor is to be'..  warned.-by judgement that he may be 
deemed to :have - made some declaration of intention . in case he neglects 
to make it actually within this definite-.per*ode of time. In other words, 
according to these provisions, the, legal fiction' is not employed. until 
the obligor still neglects to.., perform his obligation.. within socalled 
" Paritionsfrist " after the judgement has become-,final. and conclusive. 
The Code of Civil Procedure of Germany ;„which took over this _,way 
of execution abolished, however, the Paritionsfrist " system and brought 
about the shortening of the process of execution. . According to Art. 894 
of' this Code, a declaration of intention` is deemed to have been made 
upon the judgement becoming -final and conclusive. And the Civil 
Code of Japan and the Code of -Civil Procedure of Japan follow this 
example. "Constitutive judgement theory" takes the accidental effect 
of a judgement for its essential element by confounding fiction' in -the 
effect of judgement with that in itss content. 
                              IIh 
   At any rate, the -declaration of intention produced by a 'legal fiction 
must have-much the same content as that which the.'-obligor had obliged 
himself, and was ordered by judgement, to make.: -But we- ought to be 
fully aware that the contents of these twodeclarations of intentionn are 
not always absolutely the same. 
    In general, when regarded as a psychological process', ,a declaration 
of intention includes three elements; (1) an intention to get ,a certain
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legal effect_ (" effect-intention. (2) an intention to express "effect-intent-
ion" " (" expression-intention "), (3) an act worth being considered an 
expression of intention (" expression-act "). What sort of elements is 
required for an act to be considered an expression of intention is 
dependent on concrete situations. But with regard to a declaration of 
intention to be made to another person, there must be, in addition to an 
act of expression, at least an act of dispatch which makes it possible 
for the declaration of intention to reach the other party or to be 
understood by him-an act capable of making him understand the de-
clared intention without any addition of further causal acts. Consequently, 
when a declaration of intention ordered by judgement is to be made to 
another person, legal fiction extends over the act of dispatching it to him. 
But the act by fiction of dispatching a declaration is in substance by 
no means the same as that made actually by the obligor, for the former 
has in fact no such ability to make the declared intention reach the 
other party as the latter has, because the time when the declaration of 
intention is deemed by legal fiction to have been made is when the 
judgement has become final and conclusive and thereafter there is no 
oppotunity of the service or notice of the judgement. 
   This difference between a fictitious declaration of intention and an 
actual one is far from negligible. For according to the provisions of 
Art. 97 of Civil Code of Japan a declaration of intention made inter 
absentes shall not be effective, as a rule, until the time when notice 
thereof has reached the other party. Consequently, a declaration of 
intention incapable of reaching the other party can produce no substantive 
legal effect, even if it is a fictitious one. But such imperfectness of 
legal fiction is, in general, no obstacle to the attainment of the object 
for which the execution is made. In case, as is most common, the 
person to whom a declaration of intention is to be made, is the plaintiff 
himself in the procedure where the judgement ordering to make it is 
to be made, a fictitious declaration of intention comes into existence 
from the beginning within the reach of its notice, that is to say, in the 
objective situation where the other party can be, judging from social 
sence, naturally thought to be able to understand it, and so it can
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almost compare with a declaration of intention made inter presentes. 
In this case, . therefore, the fictitious declaration of intention can reach 
the other party and produce the substantive legal effect the instant the 
judgement became final and conclusive. But this is not the case when 
the declaration of intention is to be made to a third person taking no 
part in the procedure. Here the above-mentioned imperfectness of legal 
fiction will not remain unhidden. 
    Formerly a theory that denied the application of the way of. execution 
by fiction to the obligation to make a declaration of intention to a third 
person (excluding government offices) .was overwhelmingly predominent. 
The reason was as follows*: If a declaration of intention were brought 
about in a fictitious way by the judgement ordering •to make it to a 
third person, the latter is obliged to have his legal relation to the 
obligor changed by the effect of an action between others without being 
given any chance of taking part therein, or without even knowing the 
existence thereof-a situation which is obviously unreasonable and'unfair 
to the third person, too. 
   This argumentwas directed towards the very above-stated imper-
fectness attaching to legal fiction. 
   If we admit that the way of execution by means of legal fiction is 
not applied to the obligation to. make a, declaration of intention to _ a 
third person, there would remain nothing" but a way of indirect compulsion. 
The latter is, however, far more round-about han the former, and 
besides imposes an unnecessary burden and presure on both the obligee 
and obligor. Further we must give great consideration to the fact that 
the very provisions of law, do not restrict the scope of the persons to 
whom ,a declaration-of-intention is to be made. This -.is the reason why 
in Japan as well as. in Germany both the doctrines and the court 
decisions have come to approve the application of the way of execution 
by " way of. legal fiction to the obligation to make a declaration of 
intention to a third person. 
  Kohler, LTngehorsam and "Vollstreckung im Civilprozess. (1893) Archiv fur civilistische 
Praxis. Bd. 80. S. 196 ff. Kipp, a.a.O. S. 81 ff.
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                             IV 
    I think this is a appropriate consequence. But how is it possible 
to cover the imperfectness of legal fiction and to attain the object for 
which the execution is made? In this respect two ways of thinking 
are in opposition to each other. The one thinks that there must be 
resort to a supplementaty execution, and the other, that the obligee 
himself ought to take steps actually to make the, fictitious declaration 
of intention reach to the third person in the extra-executive process of 
pursuing his interest-the latter being a prevailing opinion. The former 
was recently put forth by Dilcher for the first time. He says as 
follows*: In the execution against the obligation to make a declaration of 
intention to a third person the executable claim is not satisfied and the 
execution is not closed, until the fictitious declaration of intention has 
reached the third person therefore this act of making the fictitious 
declaration of intention reach a third person is an act of execution 
made in the process of execution and as there are no provisions in ZPO 
regarding to this act, some supplement by legal interpretation is required ; 
in regard to the process in which the fictitious declaration of intention 
reaches a third person, we ought to think that, by analogical application 
of the provisions for the case where a declaration of intention is to be 
dependent on the counter performance by the obligee (the latter part of 
Art. 894 of ZPO ; the latter part of Art. 736 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure of Japan), the court of the suit in the first instance is an 
executive organ and that the obligee must apply the court for the 
service of an exemplification or copy of the judgement ordering to make 
the declaration of intention to the third person when it has become final 
and conclusive, unless he himself is willing to serve or present it to 
the third person as an assistant organ of the execution ; and thus since 
this process of the service or presentation is the executive one, it is a 
requisite for the judgement to be furnished with an executory exempli-
fication. 
* Dilcher, Die Volistreckung der Abgabe iner Willenserklarung. Zeitschrift fur Zivil-
prozess, Bd. 67. S. 225 ff.
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    The present writer prefer the consequence of the prevailing opinion 
above mentioned, thinking that it is sufficient for the obligee to be 
given an oppotunity of his actual serving or presenting an exemplification 
or copy of the judgement to the third person in the extra-executive 
process pursuing his interest. We ought to frankly admit that there 
are no provisions for the execution against the obligation to make some 
declaration of intention to get the fictitious declaration of intention to 
reach a third person anywhere in our existing law. What matters is 
only whether it is possible or not to attain the object for which the 
execution was made. Admitting that an executable claim is not satisfied 
so long as the fictitious declaration of intention does not reach the third 
person, still the object for which the execution was made can be said to 
have been as attained. For in this case the obligee finds himself in a 
legal position in which he can satisfy his claim whenever he likes by 
his own actual act to get the fictitious declaration of intention to reach 
the third person. It is naturally allowed as a technique of legislation to 
bring the process of execution to a close at this stage and leave the 
rest to the obligee pursuing his interest extra-executively. 
   Hence the conclusion : Although the. fictitious declaration of inten-
tion has not much the same content as that made actually by the obligee 
has and especially in regard to the obligation to make some declaration 
of intention to a third person the way of execution by means of 
legal fiction is far from perfect, all this is no particular obstacle to the 
satisfaction of an executable claim constituting the subject-matter of 
the execution and the imperfectness of the way of execution is fully 
made up for by its rapidity and certainty.
